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Deciding which options to engage, and which to forego, requires developing accurate beliefs
about the overall distribution of prospects. Here we adapt a classic prey selection task from
foraging theory to examine how individuals keep track of an environment’s reward rate and
adjust choices in response to its fluctuations. Preference shifts were most pronounced when
the environment improved compared to when it deteriorated. This is best explained by a trial-
by-trial learning model in which participants estimate the reward rate with upward vs.
downward changes controlled by separate learning rates. A failure to adjust expectations
sufficiently when an environment becomes worse leads to suboptimal choices: options that
are valuable given the environmental conditions are rejected in the false expectation that
better options will materialize. These findings offer a previously unappreciated parallel in the
serial choice setting of observations of asymmetric updating and resulting biased (often
overoptimistic) estimates in other domains.
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In contrast to classic economic decisions in which individualschoose from a menu of well-defined options presentedsimultaneously1–7, the options in many real-world decisions
are encountered serially and cannot directly be compared to one
another. For instance, should I take a currently available option
(e.g., hire this candidate for a position or accept this proposition
of a romantic date)? Or should I forgo it in the expectation that a
better option will come along? Insofar as accepting an option may
require passing up unknown opportunities that might arise later,
these choices involve opportunity cost and require comparing
each prospect to some measure of the overall distribution of
alternatives.
Such serial decisions arise canonically in several stylized tasks
from animal ethology and optimal foraging theory, such as the
prey selection task8,9. Here, a predator encounters a series of
potential prey, which may each be accepted or forgone. If
accepted, an option provides gain (e.g., calories) but pursuing and
consuming it costs time that could instead be used to search for
additional prey. The optimal choice rule, given by the Marginal
Value Theorem (MVT)10, is to accept an option only if its local
return (calories divided by time) exceeds the opportunity cost of
the time spent. This is just the calories per timestep that otherwise
would be expected to be earned on average: the overall, long-run
reward rate in the environment. Thus, foragers should be pickier
when the environment is richer: a mediocre target (e.g., a skinny,
agile animal that takes time to chase down) may be worthwhile in
a barren environment, but not in one rich with better alternatives.
In this setting, choice turns largely on estimating the envir-
onment’s present rate of return, which establishes the threshold
against which each prospective prey item can be assessed.
Importantly, the MVT specifies the optimal static choice policy in
an environment, and thus predicts differences in behavior
between environments. But it does not prescribe the dynamics of
how an organism might attain the optimum. Accordingly, its
predictions have most often been studied in terms of asymptotic
behavior in stable environments. But estimating an environment’s
richness from experience with offers is in fact a learning problem,
especially in dynamic environments in which the availability of
resources fluctuates over time, as with the seasons11–13.
Here we ask how humans update beliefs about their environ-
ment’s rate of return in a prey selection task and extend a trial-
by-trial learning model previously used for patch foraging11,13 to
account for deviations from the MVT that we observe. Partici-
pants are tasked with choosing whether to accept or reject serially
presented options which vary in terms of points earned and time
expended (if accepted). By manipulating the rate of reward
between blocks, we are able to examine how individuals respond
to changes in the overall richness of their environment as well as
examine dynamic trial-by-trial adjustments that occur within
blocks. Across three experiments, participants were sensitive to
both global and trial-to-trial changes in the environment, in the
direction predicted by the MVT9,10. But in all experiments, model
estimates indicated that information integration was greater for
positive compared to negative prediction errors. This asymmetry
captures a key deviation we observed from the MVT-predicted
policy: a reluctance to revise beliefs and change choices when
environments deteriorate, leading in that circumstance to an
overoptimistic bias and a pattern of overselective choices.
Results
Participants adapt to global fluctuations. We first conducted
two online experiments (see Fig. 1 and Methods for further
details). On each trial, participants were offered an option (styled
as an alien) and chose to accept or reject it. Accepting provided a
reward (points, later converted to a bonus payment) but also
incurred an opportunity cost in the form of a time delay. There
were four possible options (low delay, high reward: LDHR; low
delay, low reward: LDLR; high delay, high reward: HDHR; high
delay, low reward: HDLR; Fig. 1b). Following an accept decision,
participants had to wait for the delay to elapse before the points
were accrued and the next trial began. Following a reject decision,
the experiment progressed to the next trial.
Participants were exposed to two blocks (environments, rich
and poor), differing in the frequency of the best (LDHR) and
worst (HDLR) options (Fig. 1c). In the rich environment, the best
option outnumbered the others; in the poor environment, the
worst option predominated. Block order was counterbalanced
across participants, so that each either completed rich first
(RichPoor) or the opposite (PoorRich). Note that the two
intermediate options, LDLR and HDHR, were identical in
profitability (i.e., reward per second) and occurred with identical
frequency. To simplify the analysis, we collapse these options into
one intermediate option category. Separating them does not
change the pattern of results (see Supplementary Information
Fig. 1). Experiments 1 and 2 differed only in the duration of each
block (Experiment 1: 15 min per block; Experiment 2: 10 min per
block).
The MVT predicts that acceptance should depend on an
option’s profitability and the overall quality of the environment.
Accordingly, the decision whether to accept vs. reject an option
was sensitive to both its profitability (i.e., reward per second) and
also the environment (Fig. 2a, b). Specifically, a repeated
measures ANOVA on the percentage of accept decisions with
option (best, intermediate, worst) and environment (rich, poor)
as repeated factors revealed a main effect of environment
(Experiment 1: F(1, 39)= 15.40, p < 0.001, partial η2= 0.28;
Experiment 2: F(1, 37)= 8.38, p= 0.006, partial η2= 0.19), a
main effect of option (Experiment 1: F(2, 78)= 540.41, p < 0.001,
partial η2= 0.93; Experiment 2: F(2, 74)= 367.15, p < 0.001,
partial η2= 0.91) and an environment by option interaction
(Experiment 1: F(2, 78)= 70.27, p < 0.001, partial η2= 0.64;
Experiment 2: F(2, 74)= 38.11, p < 0.001, partial η2= 0.51). As
predicted by the MVT, in each experiment the interaction was
driven by a selective change between environments in acceptance
of the intermediate options; this change was greater than the
change in acceptance for the best or worst options (intermediate
vs. best option, Experiment 1: t(39)= 8.34, p < 0.001, 95% CI
[0.23, 0.38]; Experiment 2: t(37)= 5.60, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.20,
0.42]; intermediate vs. worst, Experiment 1: t(39)= 9.89, p <
0.001, 95% CI [0.26, 0.40]; Experiment 2: t(37)= 7.59, p < 0.001,
95% CI [0.28, 0.48], two-tailed paired sample t-tests on the
difference in acceptance rates between environments for inter-
mediate versus either alternative). However, while this effect was
in the direction predicted by the MVT (i.e., participants were
more selective in the richer environment), the magnitude of the
change was not as dramatic as theoretically predicted. This is due
in part, as discussed below, to a slow adjustment in particular
circumstances.
Participants adapt to local fluctuations. Since the quality of
environments was not explicitly instructed, the foregoing results
imply that subjects learn from experience how selective to be.
Although the MVT itself does not prescribe dynamics, it does
suggest a simple class of learning model11,13: dynamically esti-
mate the reward rate in the environment (e.g., by an incremental
running average), and then use this as an acceptance threshold in
the MVT choice rule. Such learning predicts that choices should
be sensitive not just to block-wise manipulation of the environ-
mental richness, but also to local variation in offers, since for
instance receiving a poor offer will incrementally decrease the
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estimated reward rate, and incrementally decrease selectivity on
the very next trial.
Accordingly, we examined evidence for such trial-to-trial
learning by investigating whether the decision to accept an option
fluctuated according to recent experience. We separated trials
according to the option participants encountered on the previous
trial, independent of the decision on the previous trial. To ensure
any effect of local context was not merely driven by the block-
wise environment type effect discussed above, we controlled for
block type by entering environment (rich, poor) as a repeated
factor in the analysis along with previous offer (best, inter-
mediate, worst). This analysis revealed that participants increased
their acceptance rates (over all options) on the current trial, the
worse the option on the previous trial had been (main effect of
previous option Experiment 1: F(2, 78)= 43.69, partial η2= 0.53,
p < 0.001; Experiment 2: F(2, 74)= 31.68, p < 0.001, partial η2=
0.46, Fig. 2c, d). In other words, participants became more
selective (less likely to accept the current option) immediately
following evidence that the environment was rich (previous
encounter with the best option) and less selective when it was
poor (previous encounter with the worst option), consistent with
an MVT-inspired learning model.
Evidence of block-wise learning. One additional piece of evi-
dence speaking to the learning process was apparent in block
order effects. In particular, we examined whether global fluctua-
tions in acceptance rates were modulated by the order in which
the environments were encountered. We did this by imple-
menting a new repeated measures ANOVA with option (best,
intermediate, worst) and environment (rich, poor) as repeated
factors, and this time included order condition (RichPoor,
PoorRich) as a between-participant factor. This revealed an
interaction between environment and order condition (Experi-
ment 1: F(1, 38)= 12.11, p= 0.001, partial η2= 0.24; Experiment
2: F(1, 36)= 7.24, p= 0.011, partial η2= 0.17) as well as, as
before, main effects of environment (Experiment 1: F(1, 38)=
18.22, p < 0.001, partial η2= 0.32; Experiment 2: F(2, 35)= 8.00,
p < 0.008, partial η2= 0.18) and option (Experiment 1: F(2, 76)=
555.15, p < 0.001, partial η2= 0.94; Experiment 2: F(2, 72)=
402.48, p < 0.001, partial η2= 0.92).
The interaction reflected PoorRich participants (those who
encountered the poor environment first) being more sensitive to
the change in environments compared to RichPoor participants.
That is, PoorRich participants (compared to the opposite order)
showed a greater increase in their percentage of accept decisions
in the poor environment compared to the rich environment
(Supplementary Information Fig. 1). To better visualize this, we
calculated a difference score for the change in acceptance rates
(across all options, see Methods) between the poor environment
and rich environment for each participant. Positive scores
indicate an overall increase in acceptance rates in the poor
environment relative to the rich environment. We then compared
these difference scores for participants in the RichPoor condition
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Fig. 1 Behavioral task and variables. a Timeline of the task. On each trial, an option (presented as one of four different aliens) approached one of two
targets. Participants decided to accept the option by selecting the target the option approached (right target in this example) or reject the option by
selecting the alternative target (i.e. the target the option did not approach, left target in this example). When options were accepted, the selected target
changed color to red and participants were required to maintain a key press during which the option expanded within the target. The target then changed
color to yellow indicating that participants could release the key press and the number of points obtained was displayed represented as a partially filled
horizontal bar. When options were rejected, the experiment immediately progressed to the next trial. b On each trial, participants encountered one of four
possible options each of which provided either a low/high reward (points, later converted to a bonus payment) but also incurred either a short/long
opportunity cost in the form of a time delay. c The experiment was divided into two blocks (environments) and the frequency of the four different options
varied in each of these. There was a rich environment in which the best option (low delay, high reward) outnumbered the other three options and a poor
environment in which the worst option (high delay, low reward) outnumbered the other three options. The order of the blocks was counterbalanced
between participants. Stimuli were designed by Sahua (https://www.123rf.com/profile_sahua) and are copyrighted property of 123RF Limited.
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PoorRich participants showed a significant increase in their
percentage of accept decisions in the poor environment compared
to the rich environment (Experiment 1: t(20)= 6.79, p < 0.001,
95% CI [0.122, 0.230]; Experiment 2: t(20)= 4.99, p < 0.001, 95%
CI [0.104, 0.254], two-tailed one-sample t-test on the difference
scores versus 0) in contrast to RichPoor participants who
exhibited only a marginally higher rate of acceptance in the poor
compared to the rich environment in Experiment 1 (t(18)= 1.97,
p= 0.07, 95% CI [−0.0035, 0.1048]) which was not significant in
Experiment 2 (t(16)= 1.17, p= 0.26, 95% CI [−0.046, 0.159])
with there being a significant difference between these two groups
in the difference scores (Experiment 1: t(38)= 3.41, p= 0.002,
95% CI [0.051, 0.199]; Experiment 2: t(36)= 2.08, p= 0.045, 95%
CI [0.003, 0.242], two-tailed independent sample t-tests, compar-
ing difference scores for PoorRich versus RichPoor participants).
Computational modeling. We reasoned that this asymmetry
reflected the operation of the underlying learning rule by which
subjects adjusted their behavior from the poor to the rich
environment or vice versa. Accordingly, we fit the behavioral data
to two reinforcement learning models: a Symmetric Model and an
Asymmetric Model. In each of these models, participants were
assumed to maintain an ongoing estimate of the reward rate
(reward per second), ρ, which updated every second. This esti-
mate was then used on each trial to calculate the opportunity cost
of accepting an option (ρ multiplied by the option’s time delay) at
the time of choice. Under this model specification, even though
the absolute cost (in terms of number of seconds delay) imposed
by accepting a specific option was the same throughout the task,
the opportunity cost could vary according to participant’s current
estimate of ρ. The decision to accept or reject was modeled as a
comparison between the opportunity cost of accepting an option
(effectively the value of rejecting) against the reward that the
option would collect (effectively the value of accepting). This was
implemented using a softmax decision rule with an inverse
temperature parameter (β1) governing the sensitivity of choices to
the difference between these two quantities, and an intercept (β0)
capturing any fixed, overall bias toward or against acceptance (see




































































Fig. 2 Global and local effects of the environment. a, b Participants (Experiment 1, N= 40, Experiment 2, N= 38) increased their decision to accept
according to how good each option was in terms of its reward per second and increased their decision to accept options overall in the poor compared to the
rich environment. There was also an environment by option interaction driven by the change in acceptance between environments being greatest for the
intermediate options compared to the best (Experiment 1: t(39)= 8.34, p= 3.3094E−10; Experiment 2: t(37)= 5.60, p= 0.000002, two-sided paired
sample t-tests on the change in acceptance rates between environments for intermediate versus best option) and worst (Experiment 1: t(39)= 9.89, p=
3.5216E−12; Experiment 2: t(37)= 7.59, p= 4.6782E-9, two-sided paired sample t-tests on the change in acceptance rates between environments for
intermediate versus worst option). c, d Acceptance rates were modulated by trial-to-trial dynamics. Participants (Experiment 1, N= 40, Experiment 2, N=
38) increased their acceptance rates for an option, the worse the previous option had been. Repeated measures ANOVA with previous option (best,
intermediate, worst) and environment (rich, poor) as factors (main effect of previous option: Experiment 1: F(2, 78)= 43.69, p= 1.864E−13; Experiment 2:
F(2, 74)= 31.68, p= 1.1497E−10). Best= high reward, low delay option; intermediate= low reward, low delay and high reward, high delay options
combined; worst= low reward, high delay option. Dots represent individual data points; bars represent the group mean. Error bars represent mean ±
standard error of the mean. Source data are provided as a Source Data file.
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models used a delta-rule running average14 to update ρ according
to positive and negative prediction errors. Negative prediction
errors were generated every second that elapsed without a reward
(for example, each second of a time delay). Positive prediction
errors were generated on seconds immediately following a time
delay when rewards were received. Note therefore that updates to
the reward rate are dependent on the decision of the participant.
This captures a key feature of the prey selection problem9: that
the relevant decision variable is the participant’s average earnings
given their status quo choice policy, so an option merely offered
(but not accepted) should not count.
The difference between the Symmetric Model and the
Asymmetric Model was whether there were one or two learning
rate parameters. The Symmetric Model contained just a single
learning parameter, α. This meant that ρ updated at the same rate
regardless of whether the update was in a positive or a negative
direction. The Asymmetric Model had two learning parameters:
α+ and α−. This enabled ρ to update at a different rate, according
to whether the update was in a positive (α+) or a negative (α−)
direction. This causes an overall (asymptotic) bias in ρ (e.g., if
α+ > α−, then the environmental quality is overestimated), but
also dynamic, path-dependent effects due to slower adjustment to
one direction of change over the other.
Asymmetric Model a better fit to choice data. We fit the per-
participant, per-trial choice timeseries to each model, and com-
pared models by computing unbiased per-participant negative
log marginal likelihoods via subject-level Leave One Out cross-
validation (LOOcv) scores for each participant. The Asymmetric
Model provided a superior fit to the choice data than the Sym-
metric Model both in Experiment 1 (t(39)= 7.20, p < 0.001, 95%
CI [18.77, 33.45], two-tailed paired sample t-tests comparing
LOOcv scores for the Asymmetric versus the Symmetric Model,
Fig. 3c and Table 1) and in Experiment 2 (t(37)= 6.04, p < 0.001,
95% CI [9.39, 18.86], Fig. 3d and Table 1). At the population
level, formally comparing the two learning rates (see Methods) in
the Asymmetric Model revealed that this asymmetry was, on
average, significantly biased toward α+ > α− (Experiment 1: z=
2.83, p < 0.01; Experiment 2: z= 3.73, p < 0.001, Table 1). This
meant that prediction errors that caused ρ to shift upwards
(following receipt of a reward) had a greater impact than pre-
diction errors that caused ρ to shift downwards (following the
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Fig. 3 Order effect and model comparison. a Participants who experienced the poor environment followed by the rich environment (PoorRich group, N=
21) changed choices between environments to a greater extent than participants who experienced a rich environment followed by a poor (RichPoor group,
N= 19) environment (t(38)= 3.41, p= 0.002, two-tailed independent t-test comparing the change in acceptance rates between these two groups of
participants). The Asymmetric Model was able to recapitulate this order effect by having separate learning rate for when reward rate estimates increased
and when they decreased. The Symmetric Model which had a single learning rate predicted that the change in acceptance rates between environment
ought to be the same for RichPoor and PoorRich participants. Gray dots represent individual data points and gray bars represent the group mean. Blue
triangles represent the pattern of choices generated by simulations from the Asymmetric Model. Green squares represent the pattern of choices generated
by simulations from the Symmetric Model. b This pattern of results replicated in a second experiment (t(36)= 2.08, p= 0.045, two-tailed independent
t-test comparing the change in acceptance rates between these two groups of participants) (PoorRich group, N= 21; RichPoor group, N= 17). c The
Asymmetric Model provided a superior fit to the data than the Symmetric Model in Experiment 1 (t(39)= 7.20, p= 1.1551E-8, two-tailed paired sample
t-tests comparing LOOcv scores for the Asymmetric versus the Symmetric Model. Plotted are the mean LOOcv scores over subs (N= 40) for each model.
d The Asymmetric Model provided a superior fit to the data than the Symmetric Model in Experiment 2 as well (t(37)= 6.04, p= 5.4824E−7, two-tailed
paired sample t-tests comparing LOOcv scores for the Asymmetric versus the Symmetric Model). Plotted are the mean LOOcv scores over subs (N= 38)
for each model. Dots represent individual data points and bars represent the group mean. Error bars represent mean ± standard error of the mean. +0.05 <
p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001: independent sample t-test/paired sample t-test/one-sample t-test (vs. 0) as appropriate (all two tailed) n.s.
non-significant. Source data are provided as a Source Data file.
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absence of a reward). Individually, 88% of participants in
Experiment 1 and 92% of participants in Experiment 2 were
estimated to have a higher learning parameter for positive (α+)
compared to negative (α−) errors. To examine whether asym-
metric learning was a stable feature of learning, or rather emerged
only after the environment switch (e.g., in response to expecta-
tions set up by the first block), we also reran both models, this
time fitting only the data from the first environment participants
encountered. The Asymmetric Model was again a better fit to the
data than the Symmetric Model (Experiment 1: t(39)= 5.56, p <
0.001, 95% CI [4.83, 10.36]; Experiment 2: t(37)= 6.01, p < 0.001,
95% CI [3.90, 7.87], two-tailed paired sample t-test) with α+ > α−
in the Asymmetric Model (Experiment 1: z= 5.64, p < 0.01;
Experiment 2: z= 9.96, p < 0.01).
Asymmetric Model accounts for order effect. Next, we exam-
ined the impact of this asymmetry when the environment
changed. Importantly, the model carried ρ over between envir-
onments rather than resetting at the start of a new block. (This
feature was motivated by the block order effect, which rejects the
otherwise identical model that resets values to some constant at
each block and thus predicts order invariance15.) Accordingly,
participants had to update beliefs that had been established in the
first environment they encountered (poor for the PoorRich group,
rich for the RichPoor group). Given that the learning asymmetry
was revealed to be in a positive direction (α+ > α−) we reasoned
that this update ought to occur faster when going from a poor
environment into a rich environment, as large rewards become
more commonplace (i.e. the PoorRich group), which would
explain the block order effect.
Indeed, simulating the experiment using a population of
subjects drawn according to the best-fitting parameter distribu-
tions for each model (Fig. 3a, b), we found that both models
reproduced an overall effect of environment type, but only the
Asymmetric Model captured the block order effect. Returning to
the fits to actual participants’ choices, we further unpacked the
model’s account of this effect by extracting trial-by-trial estimates
of ρ from the model’s fit to each trial and participant and entering
them into a repeated measures ANOVA with environment (rich,
poor) as a repeated factor and order condition (RichPoor,
PoorRich) as a between-participant factor. This revealed a pattern
in accord with the intuition that the global effect arose from
slower adjustment of the acceptance threshold by the RichPoor
group. In particular, there was a significant environment by
condition interaction (Experiment 1: F(1, 38)= 14.67, p < 0.001,
partial η2= 0.28, Fig. 4a; Experiment 2: F(1, 36)= 21.42, p <
0.001, partial η2= 0.37, Supplementary Information Fig. 2). This
arose out of a significant difference in ρ between environments
for participants in the PoorRich condition (Experiment 1: t(20)=
8.64, p < 0.001, 95% CI [5.98, 9.79]; Experiment 2: t(20)= 6.08,
p < 0.001, 95% CI [4.56, 9.32], two-sided paired sample t-test)
which was absent among RichPoor participants (Experiment 1:
t(18)= 1.16, p= 0.26, 95% CI [−1.32, 4.54]; Experiment 2:
t(16)= 0.004, p= 0.997, 95% CI [−1.87, 1.88]).
Greater exposure to poor environment reduces order effect. To
further probe whether asymmetric learning caused strategies to
perseverate among RichPoor participants, we ran a third cohort
of participants. The procedure was exactly as for Experiments 1
and 2 but with one key difference. Now, between the two
environments (either between the Rich and the Poor environment
or between the Poor and the Rich environment) we inserted a
third environment in which participants only saw the worst
option (HDLR, see Methods for full details). We predicted
that with the addition of this environment, participants in the
RichPoor condition would now have sufficient exposure to a
lean environment to allow their expectations to adjust before
entering the poor environment. In doing so, we predicted that we
ought to no longer to observe a difference in the change in
acceptance rates between environments for RichPoor and Poor-
Rich participants.
The Asymmetric Model once again proved a better fit to choice
behavior compared to Symmetric Model (t(37)= 5.47, p < 0.001,
95% CI [6.39, 13.91], two-tailed paired sample t-tests comparing
LOOcv scores for the Asymmetric Model versus the Symmetric
Model, see also Table 1) with α+ being greater than α− (z= 2.28,
p < 0.05). But in contrast to before, both groups significantly
changed their acceptance rates between environments (RichPoor:
t(14)= 3.07, p= 0.008, 95% CI [0.04, 0.21]; PoorRich: t(22)=
4.47, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.09, 0.24], two-tailed one-sample t-test
versus 0) and there was no difference in this change in acceptance
rates between RichPoor and PoorRich participants (t(36)= 0.77,
p= 0.45, 95% CI [0.07, 0.15], two-tailed independent sample t-
test, Fig. 4b).
Table 1 Model fitting and parameters across the three experiments.
Experiment/Model LOOcv α α+ α− β0 β1
Experiment 1 (N= 40)
Symmetric Model 96.22 (3.34) 0.0218 [95% CI=
0.0057, 0.0657]












Experiment 2 (N= 38)
Symmetric Model 64.89 (2.54) 0.0278 [95% CI=
0.0085, 0.0749]












Experiment 3 (N= 38)
Symmetric Model 80.44 (3.82) 0.123 [95% CI=
0.0528, 0.2403]












The table summarizes for each model its fitting performances and its average parameters: LOOcv: Leave One Out cross-validation scores, mean (standard error of the mean) over participants, lower
LOOcv scores indicate better performance; α: learning rate for both positive and negative prediction errors (Symmetric Model); α+: learning rate for positive prediction errors; α−: average learning rate
for negative prediction errors (Asymmetric Model); β0: softmax intercept (bias towards reject); β1: softmax slope (sensitivity to the difference in the value of rejecting versus the value of accepting an
option). Data for model parameters are expressed as mean and 95% confidence intervals (calculated as the sample mean ± 1.96 × standard error).
***P < 0.001 comparing LOOcv scores between the two models, two tailed paired sample t-test (Experiment 1: t(39)= 7.20, p= 1.1551E−8; Experiment 2: t(37)= 6.04, p= 5.4824E−7; Experiment 3:
t(37)= 5.47, p= 0.000003).
Source data are provided as a Source Data file.
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Discussion
Across three experiments using a prey selection task, we find that
individuals adjusted their choices both between environments—
becoming less selective in a poor compared to a rich environment
—and within environments—altering selectivity on a trial-by trial
basis according to the previous encounter. The block-wise effect is
consistent with foraging theory9 and previous empirical data both
from animals9,10,16–19 and humans12,20–23. The trial-wise effect is
a rather direct prediction of incremental learning rules for the
acceptance threshold, which have previously been proposed and
studied in terms of a different class of foraging tasks, patch
leaving tasks11,24–26, where choice-by-choice effects are harder to
observe due to the task structure.
However, inconsistent with optimal foraging theory, we
observed interesting suboptimalities in individuals’ choices. In
particular, adjustments in choices between environments were
attenuated when an individual’s environment became worse
compared to when the environment improved. The experience-
dependent nature of this bias strongly suggests that it is rooted in
learning, and we present modeling showing that it can be
understood in terms of an asymmetric learning rule, which scales
positive and negative prediction errors differently. Such decom-
position of learning by valence is a recurring theme in decision
neuroscience, but its consequences in the foraging setting—path-
dependent biases in estimates of opportunity cost, leading to
systematic choice biases—have not previously been appreciated.
Indeed, optimism biases of the sort implied by these models may
have particularly important effects in many real-world foraging-
like tasks (including hiring and employment decisions and mate
selection) because these learned estimates play such a key role in
choice: encountering opportunities serially forces the decision-
maker to compare them to a learned (and potentially biased)
estimate of the other fish in the sea, rather than directly to their
alternatives.
We were able to account for the deviations from foraging
theory by augmenting a learning rule that had previously been
used in the patch foraging setting11,13. Across all three experi-
ments, endowing the model with separate learning rates for
positive and negative adjustments to the environment’s reward
rate provided a better qualitative and quantitative fit to partici-
pants’ choices compared to a baseline model that did not
distinguish between these two types of adjustments. This feature
provided the model with the capacity to shift estimates of the
environments reward rate up and down at different rates,
enabling it to recapitulate the differences in choice adjustments
depending on the sequence in which participants experienced
rich and poor environments.
Interestingly, the order effect we observe, and the learning
account of it, indicate that participants carry over information
about the reward rate from one environment into the next. This is
despite the fact that participants are explicitly told at the start of
the experiment that they will experience different environments
in the task and, during the experiment, new environments are
clearly signaled. It may be that a variety of factors such as the
introduction of more transitions, more environments, time spent
in each environment, volatility, and/or greater contextual differ-
ences between environments might prompt a shift towards
resetting or reinstating previously learned reward rates thereby
mitigating the carryover biases we observe.
Our learning-based account is further supported, at least to a
limited extent, by our third experiment, in which the block order
effect was not significant in a version of the task that included
additional experience with a poor reward rate. This negative
finding is predicted by the learning model, and tends to mitigate
against other explanations (e.g., ones in which the block order
asymmetry relates to some sort of primacy or anchoring on the
initial experience) that would predict equivalent effects to the
(similarly designed and powered) Experiments 1 and 2. Of course,
null effects (even predicted ones) should be interpreted with
caution, and the difference in significance between experiments
does not necessarily imply the effects are themselves different.
Future experiments including both conditions in a single design
will be required to permit their direct statistical comparison.
One reason that learning of a global environmental reward
estimate, as studied here, is important is that this variable plays
quite a ubiquitous role governing many aspects of choice. Apart
from serving as the decision variable for prey foraging and patch
leaving, the same variable also arises in theoretical and experi-
mental work on physical vigor27 and cognitive effort28, delib-
eration29, action chunking30, risk sensitivity and time
discounting31, mood and stress25. Furthermore, whereas in





































































Fig. 4 Reward rate change and Experiment 3. a Extracting reward rate estimates (ρ) from the Asymmetric model for each participant in each experimental
block in Experiment 1 (PoorRich group, N= 21; RichPoor group, N= 19) revealed significant environment by condition interaction (F(1, 38)= 14.67, p=
0.000465). This arose out of a significant difference in ρ between environments for participants in the PoorRich condition (t(20)= 8.64, p= 3.4864E−8,
two-tailed paired sample t-test) which was absent among participants assigned to the RichPoor condition (t(18)= 1.16, p= 0.26, two-tailed paired sample
t-test). b In Experiment 3, both groups of participants (PoorRich group, N= 23; RichPoor group, N= 15) significantly changed their acceptance rates
between environments (RichPoor: t(14)= 3.07, p= 0.008; PoorRich: t(22)= 4.47, p= 0.000193, two-tailed one-sample t-test vs 0) and there was no
longer any difference in the change in acceptance rates between RichPoor and PoorRich participants (t(36)= 0.77, p= 0.45, two-tailed independent
sample t-test). *p < 0.05, paired sample t-test; n.s. non-significant (p > 0.05, two sided); **p < 0.01, one sample t-test (vs 0, two tailed); ***p < 0.001, one
sample t-test (vs 0, two tailed). Dots represent individual data points and bars represent the group mean. Error bars represent mean ± standard error of the
mean. Source data are provided as a Source Data file.
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average reward is thought to play a direct role in choice as a
decision variable, a similar global average reward estimating can
also affect choice more indirectly, by serving as a comparator
during learning so as to relativize what is learned to a contextual
reference32,33. In this respect, our study parallels another recent
line of work34–36 that studies choices between options originally
trained in different contexts to reveal effects of a global contextual
average reward on relativizing learned bandit valuations. It seems
likely that these learning-mediated effects are a different window
on the same underlying average reward estimates driving choice
in the current study, and (for instance) vigor in others37. It has
not been tested whether hallmarks of learning asymmetry as we
report here can also be detected in these other paradigms.
There is also another respect in which these results may reflect
a broader feature of learning. In a variety of other domains, beliefs
are more readily updated when people receive desirable compared
to undesirable information. This pattern emerges when people
receive information about the likelihood of different life events
occurring in the future38–41, information about their financial
prospects42, feedback about their intellectual abilities43,44, per-
sonality45, and physical traits such as attractiveness43. Although
the results we present are consistent with these past instances of
asymmetric learning, we believe it of note to find that it extends
to a foraging setting. This setting captures a key aspect of many of
the real-world choices humans undertake whereby an exhaustive
explicit menu of all options available does not exist. As a result,
choices are heavily reliant on subjective beliefs about what
options will materialize in the future. Optimistic or pessimistic
biases in this aspiration level, should they occur, can cause costly
errors due to excessive rejection of decent offers, or, respectively,
over-acceptance of objectively inadequate ones. By comparison,
although asymmetric learning has also been observed in bandit
tasks where subjects choose between a set of options, its effects on
earnings are less pernicious in this setting because it biases eva-
luations of all the options being compared in the same direction
and tends therefore to wash out. Thus, overall, the finding of
asymmetric biases in foraging is a mechanism by which a wide
range of suboptimal decisions could potentially arise.
Neural accounts of learning have also stressed the separation of
negative and positive information and updates, which (given that
firing rates cannot be negative) are potentially represented in
opponent systems or pathways3,33,46. Appetitive and aversive
expectancies, and approach and avoidance, are also associated
with engagement of partly or altogether distinct brain
regions34,47–51. More particularly, the direct and indirect path-
ways through the basal ganglia have been argued to support
distinct pathways for action selection versus avoidance3,46, with
positive and negative errors driving updates toward either
channel. These types of models also typically incorporate asym-
metric updating, though not necessarily consistently biased in all
circumstances toward positive information (α+ > α−).
One important interpretational caveat, at least with respect to
the apparent analogy with other work on biased updating is that,
compared to these other cases, in the foraging scenario we use
here, upward and downward adjustments in reward rate estimates
differ in ways other than valence. Specifically, upward errors are
driven by reward receipt and downward ones by the passage of
time, events which may be perceived and processed differently in
ways that may also contribute to asymmetric learning. Future
experiments will be required to uncover if valence—whether a
piece of information is good or bad—is the key attribute that gives
rise to the asymmetry we observe.
Another question that awaits future work is whether the
learning-based mechanism we describe also contributes to biases
that have been observed in other foraging scenarios. Notably, a
number of other reported biases, especially in patch foraging
tasks, tend to reflect over-acceptance or overstaying11,25,52.
Asymmetric learning of the sort modeled here offers a class of
explanations for this longstanding and puzzling pattern of
deviations from the predictions of optimal foraging theory.
However, if overstaying is to be explained by asymmetric learn-
ing, it would imply pessimistic rather than the optimistically
biased opportunity costs we observe here, and a bias toward
negative updating rather than positive updating.
This apparent contrast between over-selectivity in the current
study, compared to over-acceptance in others, in turn, raises a
further experimental and theoretical question: what features of
experience or environment determine the balance in sensitivity to
positive and negative prediction errors34? Recent theoretical work
has proposed that positively (α+ > α−) and negatively (α− > α+)
biased beliefs can each be advantageous, depending on
circumstances53,54. For example, computational simulations have
suggested that overconfidence about one’s own abilities can be
beneficial in relatively safe environments (where the potential cost
of error is lower than the potential gains). But such over-
confidence is detrimental in threatening environments in which
costs exceed gains53. In two arm bandit tasks, it has also been
shown that a positive learning asymmetry can be advantageous
over the long run if payouts from each bandit are rare. But
conversely a negative learning asymmetry is advantageous if
payouts are common54. However, the logic of all of these pre-
dictions is specific to the modeled class of tasks, and does not
appear to extend straightforwardly to the foraging setting. Thus,
the current results underline the need for future theoretical work
clarifying to what type of foraging situation such a bias might be
adaptive or adapted. Relatedly, the demonstration (in other tasks)
that different circumstances favor different asymmetries has led
to the prediction that people should adjust their bias to circum-
stance via some type of meta-learning54,55. To date though,
empirical work has failed to find evidence for such an adaptive
adjustment in bandit tasks56,57, although there is evidence that
biases in updating beliefs about oneself do flexibly adjust under
threat38. Here, too, there remains the need for both theoretical
and experimental work investigating how such adjustment plays
out in the foraging scenario.
The possibility of biased reward rate evaluations, and parti-
cularly that they might be pessimistic in some circumstances, may
also be of clinical relevance. Huys et al.58 propose that a pessi-
mistic estimate of an environment’s rate of reward may offer a
common explanation for a range of diverse symptoms of Major
Depressive Disorder (MDD) such as anergia, excessive sleeping,
lack of appetite, and psychomotor retardation. There is empirical
evidence for learning rates becoming less positively biased in
patients with MDD in the case of some (non-foraging related)
tasks59,60 but not in the case of others61. However, to date no
empirical work has examined learning asymmetries among MDD
patients in foraging related tasks, where the content of the beliefs
being updated (the reward rate of an environment) could underlie
these different MDD symptoms if pessimistic. Whether the
learning asymmetry we observe disappears or reverses toward a
negative direction in MDD patients is therefore an important
question for future research.
Methods
Participants. A total of 62 participants were recruited for Experiment 1. Twenty-
two of these were excluded leaving a final sample of 40 participants (mean
[standard deviation] age: 32.73 [7.94]; 11 female). A total of 55 participants were
recruited for experiment 2. Seventeen of these were excluded leaving a final sample
of 38 participants (mean [standard deviation] age: 33.71 [8.83]; 16 female; 2 gender
undisclosed). Participants were recruited online via Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Following best practice for studies with this population62, several a priori exclusion
criteria were applied to ensure data quality.
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Participants were excluded if any of the following applied: (1) did not finish the
task (n= 5); (2) made 20 or more missed responses (n= 14); (3) made 10 or more
incorrect force trial responses (either accepting options when forced to reject or
rejecting options when forced to accept, n= 1); (4) poor discriminability, defined
as choosing the worst option (low reward, high delay) a greater percentage of times
than the best option (high reward, low delay) or accepting/rejecting all options on
every single trial (n= 2). Participants were paid $1.5 plus a bonus payment
between $1.5 and $4 depending on performance in the task. All participants
provided fully informed consent. The study design complied with all relevant
ethical regulations and was approved by Princeton University’s Institutional
Review Board.
Behavioral task. The task began by asking participants to provide basic demo-
graphic information (age and gender) (Fig. 1). After providing this information,
participants read task instructions on screen at their own pace and undertook a
practice session for approximately 4 min. The two options and the environment
used in the training session were not used in the actual task. After completing the
training session, participants were then required to attempt a multiple-choice quiz
to check their understanding of the task and instructions. Participants needed to
get all the questions correct to pass the quiz and continue to the task. Participants
who failed the quiz were required to reread the instructions and attempt the quiz
again. (They were not asked to retake the training again.)
The main experiment comprised two different environments, each lasting 15
(Experiment 1) or 10 (Experiment 2) minutes in a block design (i.e., participants
completed 15/10 min of one environment and then switched to the other
environment for a new period of 15/10 min). Participants were told in the
instructions that they would encounter the same options in each environment but
the frequency of the options could vary between the environments and that their
goal was to gain as collect as many points as possible in the time available. There
was a break in-between the two environments. The background color was different
for each environment and before continuing to the second environment;
participants were explicitly told that they would now experience a new
environment.
On each trial, one of four stimuli (options) appeared and moved toward one of
two targets: one on the left side of the screen and another on the right. Participants
accepted an option by selecting the target the option approached or rejected an
option by selecting the alternate target. Participants had 2 s to respond by selecting
the left/right target using separate keys on their computer keyboard. Following
acceptance of an option, participants faced a time delay (1 or 7 s depending on the
stimulus) during which they were required to keep the key used to accept the
option pressed down. During this time the option on screen gradually approached
them. At the end of the time delay, the target turned yellow and the number of
points obtained appeared above the target (1 s) at which point participants could
release the key press. Following rejection of an option, the experiment progressed
to the next trial. If the participant failed to respond during the encounter screen or
released a keypress before a time delay had finished, they faced a timeout of 8 s.
This meant that having made the decision to accept an option, it was
disadvantageous to then abort. Note that the delays and reward associated with
each option were not previously learnt or instructed to participants. Participants
sequentially learnt these during the task itself following an accept decision when
they then observed the time required to capture the accepted option and, following
this, observed the reward collected.
As an attention check and to encourage learning, 25% of trials were forced
choice trials. On these trials, participants saw a red asterisk (*) appear over one of
the two targets and had to choose that target. This meant that if it appeared over a
target that a stimulus was approaching, they had to accept the stimulus on that
trial. If it appeared over a target the stimulus was not approaching, they had to
choose to reject the stimulus on that trial. Participants were told that more than five
incorrect forced choice trials would see their bonus payment reduced by half. At
the end of the experiment, participants were told how many points they had
amassed in total and their corresponding bonus payment.
The task was programmed in JavaScript using the toolbox jsPsych63
version 5.0.3.
Stimuli. Four different stimuli provided participants with one of two levels of
points (presented to participants as 20/80% the length of a horizontal bar displayed
on the reward screen (Fig. 1a) which corresponded to 20/80 points) and incurred
one of two time delays (2 or 8 s including the 1 s for reward screen display). These
options therefore assumed a natural ordering in terms of their value from best (low
delay high reward (LDHR)), intermediate (low delay low reward (LDLR), high
delay high reward (HDHR)) to worst (high delay low reward (HDLR)). The fre-
quency of each option varied between the two different environments. In the rich
environment, the best option was encountered four times more than the other
three options. In a sequence of seven trials, the participant would encounter (in a
random order) LDHR four times, and also encountering each of LDLR, HDHR and
HDLR once. In the poor environment, in a sequence of seven trials, the participant
would encounter HDLR four times and the other three options (LDHR, LDLR and
HDHR) once (see Fig. 1c).
Behavioral analysis. To examine changes in acceptance rates between environ-
ments, we calculated the percentage of accept decisions for each participant for
each option they saw in each environment. Forced choice trials and missed
responses were excluded from this analysis. They are not, however, excluded from
the computational models. To simplify the analysis presented in the main paper we
collapsed the two intermediate options—which have an identical profitability (i.e.
reward per second) of 10 points per second—together. We then entered these
percentages into a repeated measures ANOVA with option (best/intermediate/
worst) and environment (rich/poor) as repeated factors. We also ran the same
ANOVA treating the two intermediate options as separate levels. In this instance,
option (LDHR/LDLR/HDHR/HDLR) and environment (rich/poor) were entered
as repeated factors (Supplementary Information).
To examine how changes in acceptance rates related to the order with which
participants encountered the environment, we entered the percentage of accept
decisions into a separate repeated measures ANOVA with option (LDHR/
intermediate/HDLR) and environment (rich/poor) as repeated factors. Condition
(RichPoor or PoorRich), which indicates which ordering of environments
participants faced, was entered as a between-participant factor. As above, we also
ran the same ANOVA treating the two intermediate options as separate levels
(Supplementary Information Fig. 1).
To better characterize order effects, we calculated the difference in acceptance
rates between environments (poor minus rich) for each option (LDHR, LDLR,
HDHR, and HDLR). Hence positive scores indicate an increase in acceptance rates
in the poor environment compared to the rich environment. We then calculated
the mean change across the four options as a measure of overall change in
acceptance rate between environments. To calculate whether this change was
significant for each group separately we conducted a one sample t-test (versus 0,
two tailed). We compared the overall change in acceptance scores between
participants (RichPoor and PoorRich) using independent sample t-tests (two
tailed).
Finally, to examine trial-to-trial fluctuations, we first partitioned trials according
to the option presented (best, intermediate, worst). We then calculated separately
for each participant and for each environment, the percentage of times on the next
trial the decision was to accept. We entered these acceptance scores into a 3 × 2-
way repeated measure ANOVA with option (best, intermediate, worst) and
environment (rich, poor) as factors. To visualize these fluctuations (Fig. 2c, d), we
calculated the average of the two acceptance scores—one score for each
environment—for each option.
Computational models. The optimal policy from the MVT is to accept an option
(indexed by i) whenever the reward (ri) that the option obtains exceeds the
opportunity cost (ci), of the time taken to pursue the option. This opportunity cost
(ci) is calculated as the time (ti) that the option takes to pursue (in seconds)
multiplied by the estimated reward rate (per second) of the environment at the
current point in time (ρt):
ci ¼ ρt ti: ð1Þ
Participants should therefore accept an option whenever ri ≥ ci
Note we assumed that the quantities ri and ti were known to participants from
the outset since they were easily observable and each of the four options (i= {1, 2,
3, 4}) always provided the exact same ri and ti. But models that dropped this
assumption (and instead assumed ri and ti were learned via experience rather than
known) provided similar patterns of results (see Supplementary Information Learn
Options Models).
We assumed that subjects learned in units of reward, using a Rescorla-Wagner
learning rule14,64 which is applied at every second. After each second, the value of
the environment is updated according to the following rule:
ρtþ1 ¼ ρt þ αδt : ð2Þ
Here t indexes time in seconds. δ(t) is a prediction error, calculated as
δt ¼ rt  ρt ð3Þ
rt is the reward obtained. This will either be 0 (for every second in which no reward
is obtained, i.e. during search time, handling time, and timeouts from missed
responses) or equal to ri (following receipt of a reward).
The learning rate α acts as a scaling parameter and governs how much
participants change their estimate of the reward rate of the environment (ρ) from 1
s to the next. This estimate increases when r is positive (i.e. when a reward is
obtained) and decreases every second that elapses without a reward.
We implemented two versions of this reinforcement learning model. A
Symmetric Model, with only a single α and a modified version, an Asymmetric
Model, which had two α: α+ and α−. In this second model, updates to ρ (Eq. (2))
apply α+ if rt > 0 and α− if rt ≤ 0. This second model allows updates to occur
differently according to whether a reward is received in the environment or not.
This is close to identical to updating ρ contingent on whether the prediction error,
δt, is positive or negative65–67, as for the vast majority of trials (95%) in which rt >
0, it was also the case that δt > 0 while in all trials (100%) in which rt= 0, it was also
the case that δt < 0. We refer to the mean difference in learning rates as the learning
bias (α+− α−). A positive learning bias (α+ > α−) indicates that participants adjust
their estimates of the environments reward rate to a greater extent when a reward is
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-16964-5 ARTICLE
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |         (2020) 11:3417 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-16964-5 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications 9
obtained compared to when rewards are absent. The converse is true when the
learning bias is negative (α+ < α−). If there is no learning bias (α+= α−) then this
model is equivalent to the simpler Symmetric Model with a single α.
To account for both the delay and the reward received in the final second of
handling time (when participants received a reward), this was modeled as two
separate updates to ρ; one update from the delay (in which δt= 0− ρt) followed by
a second update from the reward received (in which δt= ri− ρt). Swapping the
order of these updates or omitting the first update (from the delay) altogether did
not alter the pattern of results.
The probability of choosing to accept an option is estimated using a softmax
choice rule, implemented at the final (2nd) second of the encounter screen as
follows:
P acceptð Þ ¼ 1
1þ exp β0  β1 ri  cið Þ
  : ð4Þ
This formulation frames the decision to accept an option as a stochastic
decision rule in which participants (noisily) choose between two actions (accept/
reject) according to the respective value of each of them. The temperature
parameter β1 governs participants’ sensitivity to the difference between these two
values while the bias term β0 captures a participant’s general tendency towards
accepting/rejecting options (independent of the values of each action). Note that
under this formulation, negative values for β0 indicate a bias towards accepting
options and positive values indicate a bias towards rejecting options.
At the beginning of the experiment, ρ was initialized to the average (arithmetic)
reward rate across the experiment11 (although clearly not realistic as a process level
model, this was included for simplicity to avoid estimation pathologies and special-
case model features associated with initial conditions). In subsequent
environments, the average reward rate carried over from the previous environment.
In other words, there was no resetting when participants entered a new
environment. Rather, they had to unlearn what they had learnt in the previous
environment.
For each participant, we estimated the free parameters of the model by
maximizing the likelihood of their sequence of choices, jointly with group-level
distributions over the entire population using an Expectation Maximization (EM)
procedure68 implemented in the Julia language69, version 0.7.0. Models were
compared by first computing unbiased per subject marginal likelihoods via subject-
level cross-validation and then comparing these likelihoods between models
(Asymmetric versus Symmetric) using paired sample t-tests (two sided).
To formally test for differences in learning rates (α+, α−) we estimated the
covariance matrix over the group-level parameters using the Hessian of the model
likelihood70 and then used a contrast to compute the standard error on the
difference α+−α−.
Simulations. To examine the qualitative fit of each model to the data we ran
simulations for both the Symmetric Model and the Asymmetric Model. For each
simulation (n= 1000), we ran a group of 40 virtual participants. For each virtual
participant, we randomly assigned a set of parameters (β0, β1 and α in the case of the
Symmetric Model; β0, β1, α+ and α− in the case of the Asymmetric Model) from the
best-fit parameters generated by the computational model (fit to actual participants
choices) and randomly assigned the order with which they encountered the envir-
onments (either rich to poor or poor to rich). Then, we simulated the learning process
by which ρ evolved as options were sequentially encountered and stochastically
accepted/rejected. The learning process was exactly as described for the respective
computational models. Crucially, ρ was initialized exactly as for the model and
allowed to carry over between blocks. We then calculated the difference in average
acceptance rates for each virtual participant over the four options (LDHR, LDLR,
HDHR, and HDLR) between environments (poor minus rich). We then calculated
the average difference score over participants in each order condition. We then
averaged these two sets of acceptance rates over each of the simulations.
To quantify the cost of the learning asymmetry under asymmetric and
symmetric learning (see Supplementary Information) we ran another set of
simulations for the Symmetric Model and the Asymmetric Model. For each
simulation (n= 500), we once again ran a group of 40 virtual participants with half
(n= 20) assigned to the RichPoor condition and the other half (n= 20) assigned to
the PoorRich condition. Here we used the average learning rates (α, α+, and α−)
and slope (β1) from Experiment 1 and fixed the intercept to 0 (β0= 0) in order to
isolate the pure cost of a learning bias (i.e. independent of differences between
models in the general tendency to accept/reject options). We then calculated the
average amount earnt for each of the 40 subjects in each model (excluding force
trials) and compared earnings between symmetric and asymmetric learners using
an independent sample t-test (two tailed).
Participants and procedure Experiment 3. A total of 59 participants were
recruited for Experiment 3. Twenty-one of these were excluded (identical exclusion
criteria as for Experiments 1 and 2) leaving a final sample of 38 participants (mean
[standard deviation] age: 34.63 [8.58]; 12 females). The experiment was exactly as
described as for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 with one key difference. In this
version there were three environments instead of two. A rich environment and a
poor environment (exactly as for Experiments 1 and 2) as well as a third HDLR
environment. The only options participants encountered in the HDLR
environment were the worst (HDLR) option. Participants had 10 min in each
environment. The ordering was either Rich, HDLR, Poor or Poor, HDLR, Rich.
Statistics and reproducibility. Each of the three experiments reported were run
once with an independent group of participants. Experiment 2 is a near replication
of Experiment 1—the only difference being the duration of the two blocks
(Experiment 1: 15 min, Experiment 2: 10 min).
Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in
the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
All data are available at https://github.com/NeilGarrett/PreySelection. The source data
underlying Figs. 2a–d, 3a–d, 4a, b, Supplementary Figs 1a–d, Supplementary Figs 2, 3,
Supplementary Figs. 4a, b, Table 1 and Supplementary Table 1 are provided as a Source
Data file. A reporting summary for this Article is available as a Supplementary
Information file. Source data are provided with this paper.
Code availability
All code is available at https://github.com/NeilGarrett/PreySelection.
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